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Obergefell’s Squandered Potential 
Peter Nicolas* 
Exactly two years to the day from its decision in United States v. 
Windsor,1 declaring the federal government’s refusal to recognize state-
authorized same-sex marriages unconstitutional,2 the U.S. Supreme Court 
dropped “the other shoe,” as Justice Scalia put it in his Windsor dissent.3 In 
Obergefell v. Hodges,4 the Court declared unconstitutional state laws and 
constitutional provisions barring same-sex couples from lawfully marrying in 
the state or having their lawful out-of-state marriages recognized by the state.5 
Obergefell was the fourth in a series of closely divided U.S. Supreme 
Court opinions penned by Justice Kennedy over the past two decades that have 
vindicated the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians. Obergefell was 
preceded by the 1996 decision of Romer v. Evans,6 striking down Colorado’s 
Amendment 2; the 2003 decision of Lawrence v. Texas,7 declaring sodomy 
laws unconstitutional; and the 2013 decision of Windsor. As both the author 
and often the deciding vote in each of these four cases, Justice Kennedy will no 
doubt leave behind one of the most important gay rights legacies in U.S. legal 
history. With each successive opinion, Justice Kennedy has steadily advanced 
both the legal and political cause of gay rights in the United States. 
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 1. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 2. Id. at 2695–96. 
 3. Id. at 2710 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 4. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 5. Id. at 2604–05. 
 6. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 7. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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Despite Justice Kennedy’s unwavering support for gay rights, securing a 
fifth vote in support of those rights after he retires is beyond the scope of his 
powers. The closest substitute would be a clear, class-based equal protection 
decision declaring sexual orientation a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. 
Such an opinion would secure an enduring precedent that would bind lower 
courts—and within the bounds of stare decisis, Justice Kennedy’s successors—
when future laws targeting gays and lesbians are challenged. It would also 
deter governmental actors from pursuing such actions in the first place, 
knowing that the laws would be subject to a level of scrutiny they would not 
likely survive. This heightened level of scrutiny would in turn give gays and 
lesbians a measure of repose, affording them the same certainty that racial 
minorities and women have that laws targeting them are unlikely to be upheld 
by courts today. 
Yet, despite having the opportunity in each of the four preceding gay 
rights cases, Justice Kennedy declined to declare sexual orientation a suspect or 
quasi-suspect classification. There were arguably sound procedural or 
jurisprudential reasons for declining to do so in some of these cases, but in 
others the path to deciding the case on such a ground was clear. In this sense, 
Justice Kennedy squandered an important opportunity to leave a more enduring 
gay rights legacy. 
Romer v. Evans was the first case to present the Court with an opportunity 
to declare sexual orientation discrimination a suspect or quasi-suspect 
classification. At issue in the case was the constitutionality of Amendment 2 to 
Colorado’s Constitution, a voter initiative that both repealed existing state and 
local laws regarding non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
prohibited the future enactment of such laws.8 The Court declared Amendment 
2 unconstitutional, but without purporting to apply anything greater than 
rational basis scrutiny.9 Procedurally, it may have been awkward for the Court 
to apply heightened equal protection scrutiny in Romer. The state trial court 
had rejected the contention that sexual orientation was a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification, and those challenging Amendment 2’s constitutionality 
had elected not to appeal that specific ruling within the state appellate court 
system.10 
Lawrence presented the Court with a more procedurally straightforward 
opportunity to declare sexual orientation a suspect classification. Lawrence 
addressed the constitutionality of a state sodomy law targeted solely at same-
sex sodomy. The Court explicitly granted certiorari on two alternative grounds: 
substantive due process, which would require the Court to reconsider and 
 
 8. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–24. 
 9. See id. at 631–36; see also id. at 640 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 10. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 n.3 (Colo. 1994), aff’d, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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overrule its prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,11 or class-based equal 
protection, since the law targeted only same-sex sodomy.12 In his decision for 
the Court, Justice Kennedy acknowledged the Equal Protection Clause as a 
tenable alternative basis for declaring the statute unconstitutional,13 but 
declined to do so because that ground would lead some to “question whether a 
prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct 
both between same-sex and different-sex participants,” and Bowers’s 
“continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”14 Justice 
Kennedy was certainly correct that the continued existence of the Bowers 
precedent was an impediment to gays and lesbians achieving equality. Pre-
Lawrence, lower courts frequently cited Bowers or the existence of lawful 
sodomy laws to uphold laws denying gays and lesbians a whole host of rights.15 
Yet, even if he felt compelled to address the due process claim and overrule 
Bowers, Justice Kennedy could have also addressed the class-based equal 
protection claim by following the example of Loving v. Virginia.16 There the 
Court struck down miscegenation laws alternatively on the ground that they 
violated the fundamental right to marry and the ground that they constituted 
class-based discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.17 
Justice Kennedy’s refusal to declare sexual orientation a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification is even harder to defend in the Court’s two marriage 
cases. In Windsor, no procedural hurdles stood in the Court’s way yet Justice 
Kennedy issued a murky opinion citing Romer and Lawrence along with 
federalism principles to declare unconstitutional the federal government’s 
refusal to recognize state-sanctioned same-sex marriages.18 And in Obergefell, 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion eschewed class-based equal protection 
grounds. Instead, the Justice concluded that such laws interfered with the 
fundamental right to marry19 protected by both the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
 
 11. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that there is no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy, 
and therefore Georgia’s sodomy statute did not violate such a right). 
 12. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003). 
 13. Id. at 574. 
 14. Id. at 575. 
 15. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102–03 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (public employment); 
Ex parte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998) (child custody). 
 16. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 17. Although one could argue that a decision rendering a statute unconstitutional on alternative 
constitutional grounds contravenes the Court’s canon of constitutional avoidance, that canon is 
focused on minimizing friction with the political branches and requires courts to construe statutes to 
avoid having to declare any conduct from the political branches unconstitutional. See Clark v. 
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998); 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190–91 (1991). Yet once the Court concludes that such a construction 
is not possible, deciding the case on only one rather than multiple constitutional grounds does nothing 
to further the underlying purpose of the canon. 
 18. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689–96 (2013); see also id. at 2696–97 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2705–07 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 19. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.2584, 2602 (2015). 
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Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.20 Even if Justice Kennedy felt it 
necessary to reach the fundamental rights claim in Obergefell and overrule the 
Court’s summary dismissal of such a claim in Baker v. Nelson,21 he could again 
have followed the Loving example and rendered a decision declaring the statute 
unconstitutional on both substantive due process and class-based equal 
protection grounds. 
To be sure, the Court has historically proceeded incrementally before 
declaring a classification suspect or quasi-suspect, often first applying a more 
aggressive form of rational basis scrutiny to strike down a law targeting a 
particular group and only later re-characterizing the earlier decision as having 
in fact applied intermediate or strict scrutiny. The Court followed this trajectory 
with respect to laws targeting African-Americans, women, and non-marital 
children.22 Since announcing a suspect or quasi-suspect classification is strong 
judicial medicine and effectively decides most or all future laws impacting a 
given group, the Court understandably treads carefully before making such a 
declaration.23 Thus, for example, the Court struck down laws denying African 
Americans equal access to educational opportunities without declaring those 
laws subject to strict scrutiny because it wished to avoid deciding the 
constitutionality of miscegenation laws before the Court was ready to take on 
that controversy.24 
Yet, even accounting for the Court’s need to proceed with caution, the lag 
period with respect to sexual orientation is excessive compared to other 
historically disadvantaged groups. Had Justice Kennedy declared sexual 
orientation discrimination a suspect or quasi-suspect classification in 
Obergefell and re-characterized the Court’s decisions in Romer, Lawrence, and 
Windsor as applying such scrutiny, that would have culminated a nineteen-year 
period, assuring the Court of the soundness of the new suspect classification. 
Historically, the lag between these two events—the first vindicating the equal 
protection rights of a targeted group under purported rational basis scrutiny and 
the second applying intermediate or strict scrutiny—has been no greater than 
nineteen years and often far shorter. 
For example, the Court first invoked the Equal Protection Clause in the 
modern era25 to strike down laws targeting African Americans in 1954 in 
 
 20. Id. at 2597–2604. 
 21. 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (dismissing appeal on grounds that prohibition of same-sex marriage 
under Minnesota statute did not raise a substantial federal question). 
 22. See infra notes 25–36. 
 23. See EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND 
THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 32–37, 74 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1999). 
 24. See id. at 36. 
 25. I am here discounting Strauder v. Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (striking down a West 
Virginia statute that discriminated in jury selection against African Americans on account of race and 
holding that it denied equal protection to an African-American defendant), and other cases preceding 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), because Plessy kicked off a new era in equal protection 
jurisprudence in which African Americans were effectively unprotected by the Clause. I am also here 
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Brown v. Board of Education,26 and a decade later in McLaughlin v. Florida,27 
the Court re-characterized that case as applying strict scrutiny.28 This in turn 
paved the way for the Court’s invalidation of miscegenation laws thirteen years 
after Brown in Loving v. Virginia.29 Similarly, the Court first invoked the Equal 
Protection Clause to strike down a law discriminating on the basis of sex in 
1971,30 a plurality of the Court re-characterized that case as applying strict 
scrutiny two years later,31 and, by 1976, a majority of the Court coalesced 
around intermediate scrutiny for sex-based classifications.32 Finally, the Court 
first invoked the Equal Protection Clause to strike down a law discriminating 
on the basis of legitimacy in 1968,33 and by 1976, appeared to acknowledge 
something more robust than rational basis review but something less than strict 
scrutiny.34 By 1988, the Court had formally coalesced around intermediate 
scrutiny for legitimacy-based classifications.35 Thus, if the Court ever decides 
to declare sexual orientation a suspect or quasi-suspect classification in the 
future, gays and lesbians will have experienced the longest lag time of any 
group. 
Justice Kennedy’s refusal to declare sexual orientation a suspect 
classification in Obergefell is all the more surprising given the relatively low 
stakes of such an announcement. When the Court held that laws targeting 
African Americans were subject to strict scrutiny in McLaughlin, it effectively 
decided the constitutionality of interracial marriage, one of the most highly 
contested social matters of the time.36 Obergefell itself directly decided same-
sex marriage, the most socially sensitive gay rights issue of this time.37 While 
other laws, such as parentage rights, targeting gays and lesbians have yet to be 
adjudicated by the Court, such laws do not raise issues nearly as socially 
sensitive as marriage—the lightning rod that generated constitutional 
 
discounting cases like Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), which found in favor of the African-
American plaintiff but did not challenge the constitutionality of Plessy’s underlying separate-but-equal 
scheme. 
 26. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 27. 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 28. Id. at 192. 
 29. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 30. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 
 31. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–88 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
 32. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976). 
 33. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
 34. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504–06, 509–10 (1976). The Court did not create the 
intermediate scrutiny standard until the following Term. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; id. at 218 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 35. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
 36. See Kenji Yoshino, The Paradox of Political Power: Same-Sex Marriage and the Supreme 
Court, 2 UTAH L. REV. 527, 540 (2012). 
 37. See Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP.COM (poll showing greater public opposition to 
same-sex marriage than to other gay rights issues, such as same-sex adoption or employment 
discrimination) (visited Oct. 26, 2015) http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/U74L-KV53]. 
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amendments banning the practice in a supermajority of states.38 Accordingly, 
announcing heightened scrutiny in Obergefell would not have come close to 
the strong medicine that it would have been had the Court announced it earlier 
in Romer or Lawrence, for example. 
The Court’s failure to declare sexual orientation a suspect classification 
has resulted in concrete harm to gays and lesbians. Despite precedents like 
Romer and Lawrence, lower courts have repeatedly upheld laws discriminating 
on the basis of sexual orientation, such as the military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 
policy39 and laws prohibiting gays and lesbians from adopting,40 reasoning that 
only rational basis review applies and that the laws satisfy that deferential level 
of review. Moreover, numerous pre-Windsor courts upheld laws refusing to 
permit or recognize same-sex marriage, applying no more than rational basis 
scrutiny because Romer and Lawrence did not announce a higher standard.41 
The guarded nature of Justice Kennedy’s opinions have not been without cost. 
Moreover, the failure to declare sexual orientation a suspect classification 
creates future harm—in the form of continued legal uncertainty for gays and 
lesbians. Consider first current or future laws restricting the ability of gays and 
lesbians to legally adopt children. Because Obergefell was laser focused on the 
fundamental right to marry and not the nature of the classification, and because 
the Court noted, without casting doubt on its constitutionality, that some states 
do not permit gays and lesbians to adopt children,42 future courts can easily 
distinguish Obergefell. Consider, as a second example, the use of peremptory 
challenges to strike jurors. Where a peremptory challenge implicates a suspect 
or quasi-suspect classification, such as race or sex, the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits the exercise of that challenge on that ground. Such a protection does 
not apply to non-suspect grounds.43 Thus, it is only if heightened scrutiny 
applies to sexual orientation that litigants may prevent opposing counsel from 
striking people from juries solely on the basis of their sexual orientation.44 
Perhaps one way to defend Justice Kennedy is to view his approach as 
that of a cautious judicial minimalist, eschewing the broad implications of a 
holding that would declare sexual orientation a suspect or quasi-suspect 
classification. Such a minimalist approach would certainly justify a decision 
like Romer. But judicial minimalism is hardly furthered by decisions like 
Lawrence and Obergefell, which avoid a class-based equal protection decision 
 
 38. See Jonathan Rauch, Red Families, Blue Families, Gay Families, and the Search for a 
New Normal, 28 LAW & INEQ. 333, 334 (2010). 
 39. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 60–62 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 40. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815–18, 
826–27 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 41. See, e.g., In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 143 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Andersen v. King Cnty., 
138 P.3d 963, 974–76 (Wash. 2006). 
 42. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015). 
 43. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143–45 (1994). 
 44. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 479–81 (9th Cir. 2014). 
2015] OBERGEFELL’S SQUANDERED POTENTIAL 143 
by instead striking down laws on the ground that they infringe on fundamental 
rights. As between the two bases for decision, class-based equal protection 
decisions are more consistent with judicial minimalism. 
Although a class-based equal protection decision in Lawrence or 
Obergefell would at first seem to represent a broad approach because it would 
apply across the board to any law discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation, it is narrower than the fundamental rights approach in several 
ways. First, a class-based equal protection decision would only apply to laws 
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, not other classifications. 
Thus, for example, in the realm of marriage, a class-based equal protection 
decision would only apply to laws prohibiting same-sex (or opposite-sex) 
marriage. In contrast, Obergefell’s sweeping fundamental rights language 
opens the door to marriage claims by others, including those seeking plural 
marriage, cousin marriage, or marriage between underage persons. Having 
declared the right fundamental rather than the classification suspect, states 
must defend all restrictions on the right. Second, by declaring something a 
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, the Court takes away the 
states’ power to simply eliminate the right altogether by treating everyone 
even-handedly.45 These characteristics make due process the stronger medicine 
and equal protection the minimalist approach. Take Lawrence as an example. 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion eschewed a class-based equal protection 
approach because it would lead some to “question whether a prohibition would 
be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-
sex and different-sex participants.”46 This is the exact opposite of the 
minimalist approach taken by Justice O’Connor in her concurrence, which left 
that possibility open but instead struck down the law on equal protection 
grounds.47 For these reasons, a penchant for judicial minimalism cannot justify 
Justice Kennedy’s approach in the gay rights cases. 
Justice Kennedy may well have an altogether different view of the proper 
role of the Equal Protection Clause, preferring an approach that is rights-
focused rather than class-focused and moving away from the rigid tiered 
approach in favor of a more unitary approach. Yet his approach lacks the 
transparency that comes with announcing a classification to be suspect or 
quasi-suspect. That lack of transparency both leaves the Court’s decisions 
vulnerable to criticism as ipse dixit of the sort employed by the Court in 
Lochner v. New York48—as the Chief Justice contended in his Obergefell 
 
 45. See Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111–12 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“Invalidation of a statute or an ordinance on due process grounds leaves ungoverned and 
ungovernable conduct which many people find objectionable. Invocation of the equal protection 
clause, on the other hand, does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at 
hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have a broader impact.”). 
 46. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). 
 47. Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 48. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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dissent49—and denies litigants and lower courts the guidance they need to 
apply the constitutional principle consistently in future cases.50 For this reason, 
Obergefell and its antecedents represent a somewhat unstable foundation upon 
which to build future gay rights victories. 
 
 49. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2616–22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 50. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 459–60 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[B]y failing to articulate the factors that justify today’s 
‘second order’ rational-basis review, the Court provides no principled foundation for determining 
when more searching inquiry is to be invoked.”). 
